Volume XCVI No. 7 April 21, 1972 40 cents

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RALPH WHITEHEAD, JR.

JESUS AS SUPERSTAR

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REVIEWS: MICHAEL E. SCHILTZ on CHURCH FINANCES **WALLACE FOWLIE** on the NEW FRENCH NOVEL **JACOB NEEDLEMAN** on the OCCULT

MICHAEL NOVAK

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NEWS & VIEWS

Rand and the Church

The notion fostered by the activity of certain revolutionary priests that the Catholic church will be in the vanguard of revolutionary change in Latin America is discounted in a Rand Corporation study undertaken for the U.S. State Department.

According to the study, the Latin American church "will increasingly reject all active sponsoring of violent revolution." It adds that "a majority of Catholic leaders consider the basic role of the church to be an attempt to orient the values of a new society instead of guiding the process of social and political change."

"Within this context," said the study, "there will be emphasis on pastoral activity." The church will concentrate on "the creation of a social, political and economic conscience which should be compatible with Christian doctrine."

Rand bases its conclusions about the Latin American church's disinclination to sponsor revolution as much on "institutional inertia" as any large theology.

Elements of this inertia are: "The conservative attitude of the church; its institutional problems; financial problems and / or relations with the state; and the impossibility of translating moral abstractions into concrete political action without potentially ruining the survival of Catholicism as a united church."

The Publishing Scene

Informations Catholiques Internationales' periodic review of religious publishing in France finds the situation still one of crisis, but adds it would be "a bit premature" to declare the religious book dead.

On the negative side, *Informations* reports that several categories of readers have disappeared, including diocesan clergy ("they would seem almost to have lost a taste for reading") and to a lesser but yet marked extent, religious congregations (whose members are "intent on a more active life").

At the same time, old favorites are losing vogue. Readers of Barreau and Evely are said to be drifting away as a result of their disputes with the hierarchical church (though Quoist and Oraison continue to enjoy a popularity). Likewise "militants" of Catholic Action, who a few years ago were reading "to deepen their faith in order to be able to function in a non-believing milieu," are disappearing. "Today," said *Informations*, "bookstores generally count such customers on the fingers of one hand."

On the bright side, *Informations* finds that books on Asiatic religions are "the rage," that "personal witness" books are "successful," as well as titles dealing with suffering, love and death. (Books on "internal debates within the church hardly arouse interest any more.")

Informations also reports a receptivity among young people to religious books, but attaches a codicil: "they want serious books about basic questions, written by authors who live what they write."

The question is, where are these books? There were 490 new religious titles in France in 1971, said *Informations*, but no truly outstanding books.



LNS

Mushy Dick et al.

Women's Wear Daily sent Chauncey Howell out to Brooklyn to talk to John Bertolini of Louis Sherry ice cream company, who's billed as "the world's greatest ice cream sculptor." *WWD* was interested in Bertolini's latest triumph: a creamy, delicious lifesize bust of Richard Nixon, made from 16 quarts of the finest Louis Sherry ice cream.

"He melts fast," Bertolini told Howell, by way of apologizing for not exposing Nixon for too long. "Can't keep him out for more than a few minutes. The nose and ears will go first."

Even under ice, Nixon is "mushy on the outside," Howell found. Bertolini assured, however, that he's "still very hard on the inside." He's also available. "He will feed up to 100 persons—if you don't let them have seconds."

Bertolini's been working in ice cream "fancy-forms" since 1933, and one got the impression from reading Howell that he yearned for the old days when folks were more appreciative of his talents. Folks like President Eisenhower and Cardinal Spellman.

Eisenhower liked Bertolini's American Eagles (assorted flavors), and especially his ice-cream cakes covered with five huge, gold-dyed tutti-frutti stars.

Spellman liked to serve bishops' miters and cardinals' birettas "at giddy parties held in The Chancery on Madison Avenue." "The miters were made of pistachio," Bertolini recalled, "and I used raspberry ice for the cardinal's hats because they're supposed to be red."

A Grand Record!!!

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's citing of the "accomplishments" of the Second Session of the 92d Congress was intended proudly, but Washington overseers can recall days of prouder doings.

Among the achievements itemized by Mansfield and duly entered in the *Congressional Record*: a marketing bill covering Indian River grapefruit; authorization to loan a Cornelia Fasset painting to the Smithsonian Institution; authorization to use Army, Navy and Air Force equipment to transport Boy Scouts to national and world jamborees; commendation of Girl Scouts on their 60th birthday; proclamation of National Beta Club Week (whatever that is); and proclamation of National Hunting and Fishing Day (the fourth Saturday of each September).

Odds and Ends

—Jesuit Father Peter Hebblethwaite, writing in the London *Tablet* on the Vatican daily *L'Osservatore Romano*: "One would get a bizarre picture of the church if stranded on a desert island with back numbers of *L'Osservatore*. The news is filtered; events come through in a strangely muted light, rather like [in a] dream world . . . Beslippered cardinals glide around dispensing wisdom. But it can snap back fiercely when attacked and is not wholly unaware of a turbulent world, generally placed under the heading of 'contestation,' which inevitably lacks that 'serenity and objectivity' which is *L'Osservatore's* proud boast."

—The *Manchester Guardian* on Hubert Humphrey ". . . the suspicion remains that he is playing both ways again. The shorthand note says one thing, the tape recording another—flip it's white, flap it's black. Now you see it, now you don't. And they talk about Tricky Dick."

JOHN DEEDY

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CORRESPONDENCE

Coup d'Etat Theology

Adrian, Mich.

To the Editors: I have just returned from seven weeks in South America and have read with interest the article "Theology of the Coup d'Etat" by Joel Algeria in your January 14 issue. I worked in Bolivia for 10 years, was superior of the Dominican Fathers there and president of the conference of major religious superiors.

The impression conveyed by Algeria is that ISAL (The Church and Society in Latin America) is a group of progressive Christians, while the Bolivian bishops, with a few exceptions are uncommitted, uninvolved, and "somewhere above this worldly reality."

Reading the documents published by the Bolivian bishops and by ISAL would lead to a very different conclusion. The seven pastoral letters of the archbishop of La Paz, Jorge Manrique (some translated and published by the Latin American Conference and some by CIDOC) are among the finest episcopal documents coming from Latin America in the past two years. They are creative attempts to find in the word of God guidance and light to grapple with the enormous problems facing Bolivia. "A New Christianity for a New Bolivia" and "Socialism and the Church in Bolivia" are outstanding. Excellent also is the letter of Bishop Gutierrez of Cochabamba, "Education and the Church in Bolivia"; the published talk of Cardinal Maurer of Sucre, "The Church and Private Enterprise" and the pastoral of Bishop Rodriguez of Santa Cruz, "The Church and the Bolivian University."

On the other hand, the documents of ISAL (the one on socialism is a good example) show little originality, even less Christian inspiration, an abundance of Marxist terminology, and so much invective that I am led to wonder if there would be less oppression were the men of ISAL to have political power than there is at the

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COMMONWEAL *A Weekly Review of Public Affairs, Literature and the Arts.*
Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y.
Printed in the USA and published weekly,
except biweekly Christmas-New Year's and June to mid-September,
by Commonweal Publishing Co., 232 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016
MUrray Hill 3-2042. Copyright © 1972 Commonweal Publishing Co., Inc.
US and Canada; $14 a year. Foreign $16. Single copies 40¢

ESCALATION IN VIETNAM

More bombs have been dropped on Indochina since President Nixon took office in 1968 than the total dropped during World War II and the Korean War combined. How many more tons of high explosives will be dropped as our response to the current incursion by the North Vietnamese across the demilitarized zone? And in the climate of escalating violence, is it hopeless to talk of peace through negotiation?

Heaven knows there has been little about the Paris peace conference on Vietnam to arouse enthusiasm. After beginning on a tragi-comic note with a debate over the shape of the bargaining table, the opposing sides have for three years berated and abused each other. The climate surrounding the negotiations has been corrosive, and last year's appointment of Ambassador William J. Porter as the Nixon Administration spokesman in Paris hurt rather than helped. The impression is inescapable that Mr. Porter has been acting under orders to play to a gallery of middle-American voters rather than to settle down to the serious negotiations his job calls for. Recently this already bad situation was made even worse, with the United States and its South Vietnamese puppets declaring an indefinite suspension of the peace conference. There would be no further discussion, the American Ambassador said, until the other side showed willingness for "serious discussions" on concrete issues defined in advance. Translation for "serious discussions": those items we choose to talk about. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong in turn charged that Mr. Porter was laying down "conditions we can never accept." Thus the weekly exchanges came to a halt, and at this point there is no indication of when or if they will be resumed.

What is one to make of this indefinite suspension of the peace talks? Some will say there is little to be lost by this development, and others will argue that it is all to the good to put an end to what was a pointless public spectacle in any case. We do not agree. This is not to say that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong are easy to deal with; they are not, partly because they have been flummoxed before, and they are wary. But it is to say that the suspension of the Paris talks by the United States indicates once again the schizophrenic character of the Nixon policy on Vietnam. Pledged when

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elected to bring the war to a speedy end, President Nixon has instead followed a policy of gradual troop withdrawals while at the same time pursuing a policy of Vietnamization, a policy calculated to preserve in power our man in Saigon, General Thieu—in other words, to achieve the fruits of victory without actually winning the war. In line with this policy the Administration has consistently insisted that only what we want to talk about in Paris constitutes "serious discussions" and that this means first and foremost the prisoner of war issue. Throughout the negotiations the Administration has shamelessly played politics with the P.O.W. issue at home, refusing to concede how much there is to be said for the opposition argument that the P.O.W. question is only a small part of an overall political settlement in Vietnam, important as it is to us Americans, and can hardly be first on the agenda. Granting the very real difficulties of bargaining with a determined foe, it is the Nixon reluctance to negotiate a political settlement in Vietnam on any terms except our own, as much as enemy intransigence, that has made the Paris talks a mockery.

Under the Nixon plan, American troops are being withdrawn, but only under the cover of an extended and intensified air war. For months U.S. fighter-bombers have consistently struck across the demilitarized zone to attack targets in North Vietnam. Yet when, at the beginning of the current offensive, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong representatives in Paris asked for a resumption of the peace talks, we rejected their appeal, stating that their offensive on the ground "is not a display of Hanoi's desire to find a peaceful solution"—unlike our bombing raids from the air, that is.

Quite clearly, President Nixon never intended to wind down the air war while troop withdrawals on the ground proceeded. Indeed, the continuation of air attacks by U.S. forces has been an essential part of the Vietnamization program, and the current intensification of those attacks is simply another manifestation of that basic policy. Over the last five years U.S. efforts in the air have killed an estimated 325,000 civilians, wounded countless more and turned six million Vietnamese into refugees. What we are now witnessing is just more of the same.

At this juncture no man can say what the outcome of the current upsurge of the battle in Vietnam will be. Yet it seems clear that if any political settlement is to be arrived at, the Administration must recognize two points, one moral and the other pragmatic—both of which, incredibly, it still seems not to grasp: first, that the war we are waging in Vietnam is unjust and is now repudiated by a majority of the American people; secondly, that events in Vietnam over the last ten years have proved conclusively that the war there is one we cannot win. If only the Administration would face these two facts squarely, the United States might return to the bargaining table in Paris or to renewed secret negotiations with some hope of success.

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CHICAGO GRASSROOTS

THE COMMON CONCERN: HOUSING

For 25 years, racial change has steadily ravaged the aging but dearly-held big city neighborhoods of America's shirtsleeved wage-earners—steel workers through bookkeepers. And the impact of this change has been brutal. The whites feel panic, and the blacks, as they buy into new ground, feel fear. Crime rates climb. The parishes decay. The schools lose their windows and their security. Storefront businesses die. Whites must desert their homes, their friends and a large slice of their equity. And blacks gain a few more blocks of *lebensraum,* yes, but it isn't worth much: the homes are overpriced and riddled by code deficiencies, the services lag, and, although white institutions are already dead, their black replacements have yet to be born.

As critical as this change has been, social policy has overlooked it. The major reform attempts of the '60s—the War on Poverty, for instance, or Model Cities—ignored the growing slum edge of the ghetto and concentrated instead on gilding its innards. Outside of government, Saul Alinsky won a national reputation during the decade for his direct action tactics. Yet, he became known for his work in all-black Woodlawn on Chicago's South Side—not for helping more extensive work among racially-changing areas. Likewise, the lore and lessons of the Urban Affairs Office of the Archdiocese of Chicago, say—during the tenure of Alinsky sponsor, Monsignor John Egan—have been lost or ignored, although they carried some effective remedies for the destruction wrought by white-to-black turnover. Locally and nationally, then, the issue has surfaced briefly and weakly, if at all.

However, it came up sharply during a two-day national housing conference in Chicago during late March. The gathering drew a polyglot assortment of representatives of 230-odd organizations scattered through 42 states—an impressive showing for what was at times a highly technical discussion of banking, insurance and real estate practices.

The meeting at St. Sylvester's parish was sponsored by the West Side coalition. This is an alliance of par-

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ishes and neighborhood groups—including blacks, Latins and whites—ranging along two of the growing edges of Chicago's miles-deep ghetto on the West Side. And the conference was bankrolled by the Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, of Washington D.C. This is a Ford-funded vehicle for Monsignor Geno Baroni, the often-quoted and jet-hopping troubadour of the ethnic-and-working-class revival—if, indeed, as the publishing industry insists, there is one.

Changing Neighborhoods

The conference's premise was this: It's foolish to go by appearance and think a white neighborhood is breaking up as soon as the first black family moves into a block. For this isn't an early sign of neighborhood change—it's a late sign: the first dark faces don't begin to arrive until the process is pretty far along. The mark appears on a white neighborhood several years before this. It simply isn't a dramatically visible one.

Yet, it's there. The banks put it there. They refuse to give mortgages or rehabilitation loans to homeowners and builders. The insurance companies put it there. They red-line the neighborhood against decent rates for auto and home insurance and write it off as a viable spot for their own investments. The savings-and-loan companies put it there. Although a huge share of their assets draws on the savings of thrifty urban wage-earners, the S&L's often won't risk giving a loan to a home or shop around their own corner. The politicians put it there. They put an exclusive priority on underwriting the downtown blossoms of their cities while the neighborhood roots are left to wither. And the real estate industry puts it there, as the self-styled respectables drop the neighborhood's business and leave it to the panic sharks. The blockbusters are delighted to scour the streets of the housing-hungry ghetto to recruit black buyers for the slum-fated area.

Five years ago, the real estate hustlers ran into trouble at this point. For not many blacks, desperate for housing as they might be, could afford to buy a home. Or, if they could, they still couldn't get racist banks to grant mortgages. And there was little recourse to tne Federal Housing Administration, for it, too, balked at giving mortgages to blacks. (Contract sales—allowing a small amount down, but demanding exorbitant monthly payments at high interest, while failing to offer the buyer any equity—were used by Chicago brokers to move thousands of buildings, but only a few states permit them.) After the 1967 riots, however, F.H.A. loosened up on this score. This, as well as new low-money-down subsidies for home ownership, opened up a huge black-market demand. Real estate speculators have tapped it since then at an astonishing rate.

As the conference aired it, the process works this way: Speculators move into a forgotten white neighborhood at the ghetto's edge. The whites are persuaded to sell off at a loss. The speculators then sell off the homes quickly (three or four days later, perhaps) at a small profit (as little as $300, but they're turning a buck on volume) to real estate firms. These companies then do a cosmetic rehabilitation on the homes, jack up the prices, recruit black buyers, and plug them into a laxly-monitored F.H.A. subsidy. A lazy or rigged F.H.A. appraisal overlooks the homes' code deficiencies and overpricing. Further, F.H.A. neglects to check on buyers' means to pay (illegally, brokers will stake A.D.C. clients to down payments) and approves the mortgage. The buyers eventually find the homes to be less than they bargained for, or too costly for them to keep up on, or both. One popular reaction has been for the buyers simply to abandon these dwellings to the junkies and torchmen—H.U.D. Secretary George Romney thinks defaults and abandonments may get close to 250,000 nationwide. Meanwhile, the mortgage has been bought up by a mortgage house, and, since this paper is federally-insured, it's paid off reliably. Thus, a broad and smoothly-flowing pipeline—for all practical purposes—is draining a large part of the U.S. Treasury into the big mortgage houses. The home sales are tangential. Detroit, St. Louis, Baltimore, Philadelphia and Chicago are among those communities hurt.

For obvious reasons, the conference took F.H.A. as its prime target. This isn't to say the agency is necessarily the chief enemy of those committed to a degree of neighborhood stability. It's simply to say it is—as a public agency of national scope—the most commonly held and politically vulnerable of the enemies. As a result, most of the conference's resolutions aimed at tightening up F.H.A.'s handling of home sales. Overall, the object was to provide an option for some whites to keep their homes, for white sellers to get fair prices, for black buyers to get the same, and for the dwellings to change hands racially without going through a forced deterioration.

The delegates during their long and arduous sessions carefully avoided merely symbolic action (a resolution calling for the firing of Romney never even got to the floor) and showed an uncanny sense of needs of the different wings of the still-surprising coalition put together for the weekend at St. Sylvester's. At one point, followers of Father Francis Lawlor—the block-club priest of Chicago's Southwest Side—called for a resolution to freeze *all* F.H.A. mortgages. Spontaneously, people throughout the parish hall—Poles, Greeks and Latins, as well as the blacks—burst out against the idea, saying it would completely deny poor people a chance for owning a home. The delegates to the conference plan to meet again later this spring.

RALPH WHITEHEAD, JR.

(Ralph Whitehead, Jr., a previous contributor, is a Chicago newspaperman.).

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THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL IMAGINATION

MICHAEL NOVAK

Late in his *Church Dogmatics,* Karl Barth remarks that the proper starting place for theological reflection is ethics. If so, "ethics" must be understood as social and cultural, not merely as individual. It has the connotations of "ethos." And, in a pluralistic culture like that of the United States, a concrete theology must point to the quite different sense of reality, stories to live out, word usage, and patterns of response in different traditions: among Protestants, Catholics and Jews; blacks and browns and whites; Italians, Amerians, Scotch, Poles, Irish. . . .

For some time in our country, we paid special attention to "those things that unite us," to what we shared "in common," to "universal" motifs (equality, liberty, personhood) in which we all participate. Our "common humanity" became the powerful, if somewhat abstract, ground of progressive politics.

The same ground, however, gradually acquired another meaning and another use. Upon it was based the dream of a technological culture: treating every person the same, like atomic units: homogenizing: spreading sameness of feeling and aspiration and alienation.

The danger to liberalism was, for generations, divisiveness. The danger today is homogenization: an impoverished bureaucratic imagination that treats everybody the same. The more earnestly liberals in America have worked for civil rights—an important, necessary, even beautiful struggle—the more they have encountered the paradoxes of universality.

If the ground of civil rights is our "common humanity," there is a temptation to establish civil rights upon universal rules, the same for everyone. But the needs of various *groups* (not to mention, of individuals) have a different history and a different shape. When there were quota systems in American colleges, Jews broke through them by the accumulating, massive weight of high performance. Blacks cannot realistically be expected to overcome by the same route the inequities they have endured. New rules must be discovered.

Once one begins making special rules to account for special historical problems, a new conception of equality has been introduced. Equality now is based as much upon diversity as upon commonness. And that, I believe, is a healthy step.

For fairness is not a matter of treating everyone according to universal rules that bear equally upon all. That is only the bureaucratic, rationalistic model of fairness. Its vice is the arrogance and heavy-handedness of those who administer the rules. The movements of liberal reform during the past forty years have, generally, embodied the dreams of the rational spirit in castes of professionals and bureaucratic structures, which a new generation sees as part of the problem, not part of the solution.

The same paradoxes are encountered in the question of busing. First, busing was an instrument (in the South) of segregation. Then, busing patterns were changed, in the South, in order to give blacks both better education and (in a sense) "freedom of choice"—freedom to go to local, neighborhood schools just like everybody else.

But now the courts in some Northern cities have ordered busing for yet a third purpose: to deprive certain white and yellow children of "freedom of choice" in order to give a "better education" to children of disadvantaged races, mainly black and brown. Busing has been chosen as one powerful weapon to overcome residential segregation.

The goals in view are "rational" enough: quality education, integration, equality. But what is the concrete, historical experience that different cultural groups bring with them toward these goals? Is the concrete experience of each treated fairly? (Should fairness be administered *mathematically?* Is each child an atomic unit, without a cultural history of its own?) Is it legitimate to deprive some groups of "freedom of choice"—the court *orders,* does not ask —in order to give "freedom of choice" to others?

Now is the hour for the liberal tradition to stress the power and influence of historical and cultural imagination. Imagination is not a faculty that lives autonomously in each of us. We are born into a web of historical experiences and symbols we did not invent for ourselves, from which we cannot escape by cutting or slashing, but only by digging our roots deeper, and reaching out higher and farther.

Being born a Jew is "a complex fate" Being born Catholic—and Anglo-Saxon, or Irish, or Italian, or Polish, or Greek —is also a historical destiny. Since our culture places so high a premium on conceptual intellect and on "principle" (universals), our attention is commonly diverted from the actual diversity of our interior lives.

Arguments between us, overlooking this imaginal and symbolic diversity, frequently miss the mark. When we see that others don't accept the same "facts" or "principles" as we do, we frequently break off discussion, shrug our shoulders, and go our separate ways.

One of the main tasks of political theology is to direct our attention to the cultural symbols and senses of reality that live so variously in our imaginations. The imagination of each of us is social, not merely private; historical, not merely recent; inherited, not merely invented. It does not imprison us, but it does give us rootage and define our finitude. It gives us special strengths and special weaknesses—and a general need for each other.

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CORPORATE DOLLARS AND FOREIGN POLICY

RICHARD B. DU BOFF and EDWARD S. HERMAN

How to explain a century of expansion and interventionism favorable to business penetration

EVER since the "revisionist" version of Cold War history emerged in the United States in the post-McCarthy era, many liberal social scientists and political commentators have become exceedingly touchy about any charges, allegations, or insinuations—real or imagined—that America's overseas entanglement could possibly be the result of economic interests or similar unworthy motives. Some have responded by citing the fact that the U.S. government carries out foreign economic and political actions that sometimes run contrary to specific business interests. Others have stressed the "internationalism" of the multinational corporations, which are said to have broken their links with their home governments, forming the vanguard of a new world community. Still another line of defense has been to call into question the "Marxist approach" with a statistical demonstration of how small our foreign economic stakes are in comparison with, say, our "trillion-dollar GNP," our $2 or $3 trillion national stock of capital, and our enormous pool of domestic resources, technology, and talent. It is argued that with such great internal income and wealth, we could hardly be "dependent" on external trade, investment, markets, or raw materials. It follows that our foreign policy need not be, and is not, based on economic considerations or business pressures.

One problem with this comforting view of things is that its proponents invariably fail to offer an alternative explanation of the long-term unity and consistency of U.S. foreign policy, with its record of over a century of expansion and interventionism that have produced "open door" conditions favorable to business penetration. This expansion process would certainly appear to be an outgrowth of deep-seated institutional forces rather than random error or the foibles of misguided policymakers. An equally serious weakness in the orthodox answer to Cold War revisionism is that its attempt to minimize the influence of America's external economic interests rests upon an erroneous and misleading statistical foundation. In examining this statistical foundation we shall consider, first, the quantitative measures usually invoked to downgrade the importance of this nation's foreign economic stakes. We start with the foreign trade-to-Gross National Product (GNP) ratio.

The United States imports approximately $45 billion of merchandise from other countries each year, and it exports about the same amount. These are very large absolute values—although if we take GNP or National Income as our base, imports and exports do constitute "only" four or five percent by comparison, and have been dismissed on this ground as "relatively insignificant." By analogous logic, of course, the automobile industry may be judged to be of scant importance in the domestic economy; it accounts for roughly the same proportion of GNP as foreign trade. In this case, however, economists unanimously consider autos as a bellwether sector, and they disregard the fact that it represents "only" four or five percent of GNP. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries together claim a similar or somewhat smaller share of GNP and could likewise be dismissed as inconsequential in terms of percent-of-GNP logic.

As a guide to economic interests and political actions, the trade/GNP ratio has other flaws as well. It tells us nothing about the composition of exports and imports, the feasibility of import substitution, or the role that

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trade plays in the capital budgeting plans and profit horizons of American business. Furthermore, the trade/GNP ratio conveys no idea whatever about the importance of foreign commerce as a "swing factor" in our balance of payments. In 1971, for the first time in 83 years, the United States incurred a deficit on merchandise trade account (of $2.047 billion), and this rapid deterioration played a decisive role in the international monetary crisis that came to a head on August 15, 1971 and led to the December 18th agreement to devalue the dollar. In view of such events, foreign trade obviously exerts an influence on national policymaking far out of proportion to the "small percentage of GNP" it represents.

The same points can be made as regards foreign investment, whose importance is also denigrated as amounting to "only a tiny fraction of all the capital invested inside the borders of the United States." If external investment and the benefits that flow from it are significant for all of the multinational corporations and a majority of the larger financial institutions (a question we shall take up shortly), then the impact of this investment on the political economy of the United States may well transcend its "low percentage" of whatever aggregate variable might be chosen to disprove the point.

In brief, then, macro-statistical ratios such as trade/GNP or foreign investment/total national investment can be grossly misleading as bases for evaluating the weight of economic forces in the external policies of the United States. What is more, a closer examination of the relevant data—to which we now turn—indicates that even in purely statistical terms foreign economic involvement is of critical importance for corporate business and finance and for the growth imperative which dominates its planning and operations.

Foreign Activities and Profitability

FIGURES computed from U.S. government data by two Harvard economists, Thomas Weisskopf and Frank Ackerman, show that the rate of profit on foreign private investment by American corporations has consistently exceeded their return on domestically invested capital. From 1950 through 1969, after-tax profits on domestic capital fluctuated between 6.3 percent in 1961 and 9.0 percent in 1951 (with the exception of the unequalled 11.1 rate in 1950). The rate of after-tax profits on foreign investments reached a peak of 17.3 percent in 1951 and averaged 11 to 12 percent through the 1960s—nearly twice the level of domestic profitability.

On top of that, the share of total corporate profits derived from foreign operations has been climbing steadily. In the early 1950s foreign earnings constituted between 7 and 11 percent of all corporate profits; by the late 1960s, 14 to 18 percent of all corporate profits were coming from overseas operations. These data, it should be pointed out, relate only to foreign direct investments in owned or controlled subsidiaries. They exclude profits from non-control investments abroad as well as from the import and export of goods to and from the United States. The addition of those two sources would easily push earnings from all foreign activities to 20 percent or more of total U.S. corporate profits.

There are, moreover, two sources of understatement in the statistics of profitability on direct investments. First of all, profits made by overseas affiliates are affected by deductions for exploration and depletion costs (especially in the oil industry), by artificially high prices paid for inputs purchased from parent companies in the United States, and by royalties and fees charged for the use of U.S.-based patents, copyrights, and similar intangible property. Second, the Weisskopf and Ackerman figures are *averages,* for all of corporate business. There are strong indications that, for the 200 or so corporations that increasingly determine the state of health of the U.S. economy, foreign profits are decidedly more important than those reflected in the statistical averages, impressive though they are in their own right.

In 1970, for example, IBM earned over half its net profits from external operations. During that year, IBM chairman Thomas J. Watson stated, "more of IBM's profit was derived outside the United States than inside—a very exciting turning point in our history." For both National Cash Register and Gillette, 51 percent of total profits originated abroad; for Dow Chemical the figure was 44 percent; for Goodyear 43, for Revlon 40, for Johnson & Johnson 36, Otis Elevator 35, Union Carbide 29, General Electric 21, General Motors 19. Other firms with high foreign profit ratios include Armco Steel, Alcoa, Bucyrus-Erie, Eaton Yale & Towne, Colgate Palmolive, Proctor and Gamble, Polaroid, International Harvester, Caterpillar Tractor, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, Uniroyal, National Biscuit, Eastman Kodak, Chrysler, Ford, Pfizer, Singer, Woolworth, and all the international petroleum companies (not to mention the celebrated ITT conglomerate, whose extensive overseas operations have involved it waist-deep in foreign politics from Chile all the way to the Common Market, one of whose "fathers," former Belgian Prime Minister Paul Henri Spaak, is an ITT board member.

For the major banks, too, the proportion of deposits, loans and earnings acquired through foreign branches is large and increasing. Among the few large banks with substantial earnings gains in 1971, according to the *American Banker,* "higher total profits were largely derived from increases in their international earnings, reflecting the large rise in total assets and liabilities of United States bank branches in foreign countries—they were up from $47 billion at the start of 1971 to almost $57 billion by the end of September [1971] . . .".

CUNY economist Richard Wolff has found that by late 1970 from 26 to 46 percent of all deposits of the

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eight biggest New York banks were foreign. Chase Manhattan and First National City, the leading international banks, had 40 and 46 percent of total deposits overseas. The most recent annual reports, as of year-end 1971, show similar percentages: 44 percent of First National City's $24.4 billion of deposits were in foreign branches, 33 percent of Morgan Guaranty's $10.7 billion, 29 percent of Bankers Trust's $8.9 billion, 20 percent of Manufacturers Hanover's $12.2 billion. Of $7.2 billion of deposits with the First National Bank of Chicago, over one-fourth were abroad. Even some "smaller" banks like Marine Midland-New York, with $4.0 billion of total deposits, and the Mellon Bank and Trust of Pittsburgh,, with $5.2 billion, had 33 and 22 percent of their desposits overseas respectively.

Information on the contribution of overseas business to total U.S. commercial banking profits is not publicly available. Nonetheless, asserts Wolff, "some specific bits of evidence suggest how important foreign-earned profits are for at least some U.S. banks. In 1964, Chase Manhattan derived 14 percent of its net profits from foreign business. From 1957 to 1967, the same proportion for the Manufacturers Hanover Bank rose from 10 to 25 percent. For 1969, Bank of America indicated that about 20 percent of its net after-tax profits came from its foreign operations. There are general indications [from a 1967 study by a Federal Reserve official] that such proportions are typical for the major U.S. banks active abroad."

Quantitative Importance

OVERSEAS investments by U.S. firms may represent only a modest part of "total corporate assets over $1.3 trillions," as a noted economist wrote in 1967, but this kind of statistic is hardly relevant for analyzing the strategies of the leading American corporations. Ordinarily, our most reputable economists tell us that we must look to the margin to understand current decision-making processes and economic trends. And at the margin we find—as we have already pointed out —that foreign investment and sales produce significantly higher profit rates than their domestic counterparts. It is no surprise, then, that this foreign business sector has attracted a rising share of the recent investment efforts of the larger U.S. corporations. As a result, direct foreign investment has been growing at an average annual rate of almost 10 percent, from $11.8 billion in 1950 to $31.9 in 1960 and $85 billion in early 1972. The value of direct investment abroad rose from five percent of the total invested capital of U.S. corporations in 1950 to 10 percent by 1970-72.

This huge direct investment is not only important in its own right, the sales it generates provide a vital beachhead in foreign markets for firms constantly striving to enlarge their "growth" potential. According to the widely-quoted formula of Judd Polk of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, every dollar of foreign direct investment produces at least two dollars of output. U.S. direct investment abroad, that is, creates for itself a market of some $170 billion. Polk told the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1970 that "our $143 billion investment stake abroad," including both direct and other long-term investment ("portfolio," or stocks and bonds of foreign firms owned by American firms and individuals) carried with it a "product profile of $220 billion."

In 1970, U.S. merchandise exports amounted to $43 billion. If we add to this a (conservatively) estimated



$160 billion of sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations for 1970, we come up with a total of over $200 billion—a huge market by anyone's standards, and with a value equivalent to 21 percent of America's 1970 GNP.

It is true—as some may reply in rebuttal—that our own quantitative measures of American economic involvement abroad largely reflect this nation's links with Europe, Canada and Japan, rather than with the "third world," the scene of our principal overt and covert military actions. But this fact, so far as we are concerned, means that even in areas of the world where direct U.S. economic interests are "small," they are apparently anything but unimportant to the American business community. Furthermore, as political scientist Jonathan Galloway observes, "if the investments in Europe of U.S. firms depend on the investments in raw materials or agricultural products in less developed countries, then, even if the stakes in Europe are greater, the stakes in the poorer countries are crucial. For instance, approximately 25 percent of U.S. direct investments in Europe are in oil. These operations depend on oil imports from the developing world. Consequently, it is not very enlightening to separate the two areas of investment if there are such essential linkages."

Raw Material Imports

"HAS THE United States of America the material means to sustain its civilization?" In 1952 the President's Materials Policy Commission, headed by CBS chairman William Paley, opened its investigation

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with this query. It concluded that America's spiraling consumption of raw materials could be met, but only with continued access to foreign sources, since domestic reserves were sufficient to supply a small and shrinking fraction of U.S. needs. This theme was repeated in the Rockefeller Brothers Fund reports of 1958 and 1959. In 1963 the Washington-based Resources for the Future, established by Ford Foundation grants to expand upon the work of the Paley Commission, completed a thorough survey of raw materials requirements and sources. Projecting America's needs through the year 2000, it predicted such a stupendous growth in U.S. demands "that in the future even larger amounts of certain items will have to be drawn from foreign sources if demand is to be satisfied without marked increases in cost." The same year the Government's own *Minerals Year Book* carried estimates of how much of each mineral needed by U.S. industry had to be imported. At the top of the list was chromium, of which 100 percent had to be imported. Foreign source ratios for other vital minerals were cobalt 98 percent, manganese 94 percent, nickel 86, bauxite 85, tin 78, zinc 44, tungsten 43, lead 35, copper 25, iron 22. Another study reported that in 39 commodities critical to the American economy more than 80 percent had to be imported, and that in only 23 commodities of the 97 surveyed could the United States be called self-sufficient.

Such data signify a pronounced and growing dependence on external sources of raw materials. How can they be brushed aside as of little consequence in U.S. foreign policymaking? One way is to respond that "imports continue to be used since they are often cheaper" —in other words, our apparent dependence on foreign supplies is merely a matter of price. A well-known international trade economist, for instance, assures us that this situation "could be readily reversed" simply by increasing domestic raw materials prices as an incentive to U.S. producers to expand output.

Unfortunately, however, America's "high mass consumption" affluence is based on a gargantuan ingestion of industrial raw materials *at low cost*. As is well known, this country, with six percent of the world's population, accounts for 25 to 50 percent of the annual global consumption of nonrenewable mineral and fossil resources. A policy of real self-sufficiency would have to push up raw materials prices substantially, and in some cases drastically, with incalculable repercussions for industries like construction, consumers and producers durables, transport, communications, and electricty and electronics, all currently dependent on cheap inputs of aluminum, copper, tungsten, manganese, petroleum, and other resources.

This response assumes, further, that elasticity of production is positive for all of these resources—that domestic supplies *do* exist and are uneconomic only at currently low prices. For several raw materials this simply is not the case. The United States has no chrome or nickel, little bauxite, manganese, tungsten, or tin. Raising the relative prices of such commodities is not the answer, for here we are dealing not with scarcity relationships but with non-availability or virtual exhaustion.

Another difficulty with this type of argument is that it totally ignores the actual, workaday considerations that enter into the shaping of policy. A firm in the copper business seeking inexpensive raw materials is hardly likely to terminate its search with the knowledge (which it already possesses, in all probability) that expensive domestic alternatives exist. It is precisely this profit-threatening increase in costs that the firm is struggling to avoid. We can therefore expect it to continue looking for foreign sources, while at the same time pressing the government to assist it in that process. The government, it is true, may take a larger view of things, but the higher domestic costs, combined with similar urgent requirements on the part of other raw-material consuming businesses with a substantial impact on domestic income and employment, make access to cheap foreign sources eminently desirable from the standpoint of government policymakers as well.

Another conventional response to this country's clear and present dependence on foreign raw materials is to evoke that all-purpose American panacea, "technology." In January 1972 a Columbia University economist, criticizing "the need-for-raw-materials thesis" as an explanation of the noteworthy belligerence of U.S. foreign policy, wrote that "changes in technology accelerate the trend toward American self-sufficiency. Spectacular developments . . . such as the development of synthetic ammonia and artificial rubber, have been matched by hundreds of new processes that free the economy from dependence on foreign resources."

The truth of the matter is that our domestic industrial base and our export sector are becoming *more* reliant on "high technology products"—chemicals, machinery, aircraft, instruments, office equipment—which themselves require greater proportions of imported raw materials, not less. "Technological progress," rather than serving as a bail-out device, appears to be deepening our dependence on foreign sources of metals and oil. This, in fact, is one conclusion of an 18-month study by Commerce Department economist Michael Boretsky, who predicts that in 1980 the United States will be importing 50 percent of its total raw material consumption compared with 30 percent at present.

* * *

The statistics cited above are all the more meaningful when placed in the context of the internal dynamics of American business. The modern corporation is profoundly growth-oriented—with growth seen as the prerequisite for long-term viability and profit expansion.

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This growth imperative commands the attention and energy of corporate management and makes the search for new markets, cheaper raw material sources and enlarged investment opportunities a matter of compelling urgency. To stand still in technique, product development, or market penetration is to violate the basic business norm that calls for a continuous, long-run expansion of earnings and sales via growth.

"Normally investment, even when it appears new or expansionary, is necessary to maintain competitiveness and is made to strengthen the continued earning ability of the enterprise as a whole, not just to produce additional profits. . . Growth is organic and not incremental and can be arrested only at the expense of viability"—this, from an appraisal of the importance of U.S. corporate investment abroad by the prestigious National Industrial Conference Board in 1966. "Earnings growth," agrees Eastern Gas and Fuel President Eli Goldston, "has become the consuming objective of American business." If true, then a system of such growth-propelled corporations should be expected to press continuously toward any potential market or investment opportunity, unless halted by political obstacles that this system is unable to overcome.

In this connection it is important to recognize that the quest for new markets and new profit opportunities also has led the larger business firms to cultivate domestic military as well as external markets. A great deal of attention has been paid to the largely abortive diversification *out* of defense by exclusively military suppliers; neglected has been the far more important and widespread diversification *into* defense by the larger corporations. Only two of the 100 largest industrial corporations did under $100,000 worth of business with the Pentagon in fiscal 1971. The important multinational corporations in autos, aircraft, rubber, electronics and oil are almost all major defense contractors, and a large fraction of the other multinationals have significant commitments in military contracting (even Singer did five percent of its business with the Pentagon in 1970). This represents an ominous convergence of interests, with a huge arms budget and an aggressive foreign policy meeting a dual need of the large corporations: to protect and enlarge foreign economic opportunities *and* to produce lucrative contracts for their military divisions.

When it is argued that the Vietnam intervention cannot be "explained" by economic interests because our direct stake in Southeast Asia is far too small to compensate for our military outlays there, two salient points are missed. The obvious one is that some people and political groupings gain, and others lose, from the decision to maintain client states by military force in that part of the world. It is the underlying population—with limited knowledge, dispersed interests and marginal impact on foreign policy—that bears the brunt of losses on "the balance sheet of imperialism." Those who gain may be a small minority, but they know where their real interests lie, and they normally exert great leverage on foreign policy. Under these circumstances it is easy to see why interventions might be undertaken even where net social losses were a highly probable outcome.

The less obvious (but perhaps more relevant) point is that the *ideology* of anti-Communism and "free world" preservation, and its implementation, in the long-run serves the interests of corporate business more than any other sector of our society. This ideology has helped create a political environment that permits, if it does not necessitate, interventions that are irrational if each of them is taken in isolation. But such crusading political philosophies, and their militarist-interventionist offspring, serve a useful function for the upper tier of a hierarchical social structure. It is this upper tier that is the prime beneficiary of America's large overseas economic interests and associated arms business. And, as Thorstein Veblen pointed out 68 years ago, "a strenuous national policy" opens the way "to the facile management of national affairs" by the more substantial citizens of the community.

"In this direction, evidently, lies the hope of a corrective for 'social unrest' and similar disorders of civilized life." "In those modern communities whose hearts beat with the pulsation of the world-market . . . the barbarian virtues of fealty and patriotism . . . find expression in an enthusiasm for the commercial aggrandizement of the nation's businessmen." The aggressive pursuit of external interests, in sum, provides to the business community both direct economic benefits and a favorable socio-political climate, with built-in "correctives to social unrest" that facilitate the continued orderly pursuit of business.

SARA VAN ALSTYNE ALLEN

TWO NUNS ON A CITY BUS

It was their hands I saw, ringless, pure,
Folded one on the other, patient, tireless.
Did those fingers remember flowers torn in the frenzy
Of spring-time, the stalks broken but the petals
Held to the petal-face?

Here on the late bus the hands lie
Composed on the new habits,
Closer to the fashion of today, more conforming,
But the hands recall the saints and the shadow
Beside the cross, and the lifting
Of the sick, and the cool cloth on the weary brow.

It was their hands I saw
As they moved quietly to their destination,
Folded one on the other, patient, tireless.

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CAMILO TORRES: REVOLUTIONARY-THEOLOGIAN

PHILLIP BERRYMAN

A theological primacy of social revolution over church reform

I have left the rights and privileges of the clergy but I have not ceased to be a priest. . . . I have stopped saying Mass in order to bring about love for neighbor in the temporal sphere, economic and social. When my neighbor has nothing against me, when I have brought about the Revolution, I will offer Mass again if God permits. I believe that in this way I am following the command of Christ, "If you are bringing your gift to the altar and there remember that your brother has something against you. . ."

—Camilo Torres, August 1965

The proper mission of the priest, as well as of the Church, that entrusted to it by Christ, is not of the political, economic or social order but of the religious order (cf. GS 42); nevertheless, within the line of his ministry he may contribute greatly to the establishment of a more just secular order, above all where the human problems of injustice and oppression are more serious; but always preserving ecclesial communion and excluding violence in word and acts as non-evangelical.

—Synod of Bishops, October 1971

In February 1966 Camilo Torres was ambushed and killed after four months of guerrilla activity with the National Army of Liberation in Colombia. He has long since passed over to mythical celebration in protest songs and posters. His option continues to prick the conscience of many Christians in Latin America and has helped to inspire the formation of groups of Christians who publicly advocate socialism in a half dozen countries.

For some he is a symbol of the Revolution; for others a sincere man who "went to extremes." He is seldom cited as a thinker even by those who are working out a theology of liberation. I consider his thought to be a theological breakthrough which deserves more attention than just a passing footnote. In some ways his positions are more vital now than they were six years ago.

His thought is expressed in essays, conferences, interviews, letters and newspaper articles which span ten years from his time as vice-rector at the Latin American college in Louvain to his commitment as *guerrillero*. The most formal documents are sociological treatises on problems in Colombia: urbanization, university, internecine *violencia*, underdevelopment. These later give way to more frankly political and polemical statements. Throughout one can trace a gradual radicalization and Latinamericanization as he moves away from a "developmentalistic" to a revolutionary position. (I am using Camilo Torres, *Cristianismo y Revolución*, Maldonado *et al.*, eds., Mexico, 1970.)

Camilo expresses himself in a straightforward and rather unimaginative fashion:

> I discovered Christianity as a life centered totally on love of neighbor; . . . It was later that I understood that in Colombia you can't bring about this love just by beneficence. A whole change of political, economic and social structures was needed. These changes demanded a revolution. That love was intimately bound up with the revolution.

This conclusion is frequently repeated in similar words. It is a syllogism:

> Christianity means (efficacious) love.
> (Efficacious) love in Colombia means revolution.
> Ergo, Christianity in Colombia means revolution.

One could wish for more poetry, for a Berriganish verve. But such bald expression at least forces you to face the issue.

When Camilo joined the guerrillas, the Vatican Council was winding down and polishing its documents. It is doubtful that he had occasion to read "The Church in the Modern World." In any case, his own option led him beyond its position. The Council Fathers went on record as recognizing that the "world" has its own dynamisms and that the church cannot give all the answers but rather must listen. The theological codename was the "autonomy of the secular order."

The bishops contemplating the "world" from Europe in 1965 take basically optimistic views. One can only speculate that the redacting commissions were working in the afterglow of spaghetti and wine. Indeed there are problems out there but they are rather a "crisis of growth" on the way toward the Omega station. Certainly it does not occur to the bishops to question the legitimacy of the international system or of governments, to take one example.

Things look different, however, out in the colonies. The "signs of the times" are read differently from the

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bottom of the pile. In the last several years it has become increasingly clear that it is not mere coincidence that "luxury and misery rub shoulders" (GS 63) but that the underdevelopment of the majority is the by-product of the development of the privileged. To use the catchwords: the problem is not "backwardness" but "dependence"; the solution lies not in "modernization" but in a "liberation" which permits the creation of a new society. Latin American social scientists are working out new categories and frameworks to express this position and the theologians have latched onto their thought as a particularly Latin American way of reading the signs of the times.

Today the starting point tends to be international economic imperialism as a macro-framework of interpretation which includes other types of domination-dependence. Camilo anticipated these themes though he customarily refers to the national level, perhaps as being closer to experience.

> In the present circumstances in Latin America, we see that you can't feed, clothe, or shelter the majorities. Those who wield power constitute that economic minority which dominates political power, cultural and military power, and, unfortunately, ecclesiastical power in those countries where the church has temporal goods.

Obviously this group will not act against its own interests.

> It is necessary, then, to take the power away from the privileged minorities to give it to the poor majorities. This, if it is done rapidly, is the essence of a revolution. . . . The Revolution is the only way to get a government which feeds the hungry . . . not only occasionally and in passing, not only for a few but for the majority of our neighbors. For this reason the Revolution is not only permitted but obligatory for Christians who see in it the only efficacious way to bring about love for all.

The theologically significant aspect is the clear perception of the impossibility of neutrality in a conflictive situation and the imperative of taking sides. By contrast the recent Synod of Bishops seems to row in circles. From their olympian vantage point they recognize that the dominating nations and classes manifest an ever-increasing concentration of riches and are able to utilize ever more modern techniques of control, while the masses become more marginal. Still they do not question the legitimacy of the system, nor do they advocate taking sides. In good "autonomy of the secular" language they maintain:

> It does not pertain to the church as religious and hierarchical community, to offer concrete solutions for justice in the world in the social, economic and political field.

Christians, like other citizens, ought to seek the common good, fulfill their duties faithfully and competently and act as a "ferment" in society. The theology which facilitated an "opening to the world" now is utilized to defend a somewhat neutral attitude toward conflictive situations.

For Camilo Torres the Revolution is a "Christian imperative." We are obligated to be identified with the popular majorities in their struggle for liberation, an identification which means breaking with, and opposition to the dominant minority. On the much-debated question of violence his position is simple: "The Revolution can be peaceful if the minorities don't make violent resistance."

Political Theology

Since 1968 the notion of "political theology" is in the air. It is attractive to think of the church as a "permanently critical institution" in society denouncing abuses and pointing ahead to utopia. In its original European version it tends to be a literary movement rather than the expression of an actual taking sides. This is perhaps understandable in the context of European politics.

The Latin American experience, however, is that traditional politics tends to be a power struggle among factions of the oligarchy and a spectator sport for the majorities. This is particularly the case in Colombia where the Liberal and Conservative parties have made a pact to alternate in power, an agreement also designed to prevent the formation of parties representing class interests. If your reading of the signs of the times leads you to deny the legitimacy of the political system, then your "political theology" becomes a theology of revolution. One's reading of these signs being influenced by one's social class, it follows that the privileged and the bishops are not likely to make such a reading, nor, consequently, to embrace such a theology.

Camilo shows little preoccupation with the themes of church reform.

> When we succeed in changing the structure of political power and the church is poor, that will help us change the structure of the Catholic church.
>
> In the present age it is necessary to demonstrate that the church does not depend on the capitalist system and that Christianity has enough vigor to christianize a socialist society. In times of transition there are confusions, especially when the church has temporal interests to defend bound up with a system which is beginning to disappear.

This is a theological position. Camilo maintains in effect that there is a theological primacy of social revolution over church reform. It is at this point that the emerging Latin American theology departs from the European matrix.

This tension continues to be felt, especially by priests, in all parts of the continent, though it must be ad-

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mitted that there is more elbowroom today than six years ago. Such a theological position reflects a pastoral option, for the commitment is prior to, or at least concomitant with, the theology. The Synod seems to have this situation in mind when it observes:

> In a world where political implications appear in almost all problems, there are not lacking those who believe to be indispensable a participation in politics, nay more, in revolutionary action.

(This adjectival use would seem to be the only mention of the phenomenon of revolution in the final documents.) Noting that priestly ministry is a human activity "more excellent than others," they admit that priests as citizens certainly have a right to participate in politics like any citizen but

> since political options are contingent by nature and never give total, adequate and perennial expression to the gospel, the presbyter, witness of things to come, ought to maintain a certain distance from any political office or activity.

Nor should his option be made to seem to be the only legitimate one nor become a "motive of division among the faithful." As an outside possibility such activity is admitted with the consent of the bishop.

The document does not consider a possible distinction between political activity within a system assumed legitimate and a situation of oppression which is by that fact illegitimate. It does not occur that the bishop who is to give his consent or the Christians who are not to be "divided" may be identified with the privileged minority. To be above all ideology "pointing toward things to come" may make one unwittingly a defender of the ideology of the system. In an oppressive system what gives "total, adequate and perennial expression to the gospel"? Blessing a new bank? Teaching in a middle-class Catholic school? Celebrating Mass?

For Camilo one of the vital currents of reform was the revaluation of poverty, not only in spirit.

> Personally, I don't believe in a spiritual poverty which is not reflected in material poverty, nor in an individual poverty in persons who belong to a rich society. I believe that poverty ought to be material, individual and social, besides spiritual.

Poverty means identification with the poor majorities. This radicalizes those sectors of the church institution which take such an option.

At the outset I suggest that Camilo be regarded as a theological thinker. He left no theological research. His vocabulary seems to echo Maritain and Congar. Yet he intuitively caught the central theological concerns of the church in Latin America in our generation. He sees revolution as a Christian imperative; he recognizes that this will not come about unless the popular majorities take power; he thus opts for a primacy of revolution over church reform for Christians and even for priests. If theological work is to be gauged by insight as well as by literary and scholarly activity, he produced theology. Ernst Bloch calls Münzer the "theologian of the revolution"; we can with equal right concede the title to Camilo Torres.

Of course he failed. Forced out of the exercise of his priesthood, he took to the road in the latter part of 1965 addressing rallies of workers, peasants, students, barrio-dwellers. He produced a newspaper and what seemed to be a going coalition *Frente Unido*. It seemed logical: if the "people" were 80 percent, they should unite and take power. When the persecution began in earnest he went underground and to the guerrillas, where he lasted four months. Can we not say that the very efficiency of the system in eliminating him is proof of his basic insight?

Interesting parallels with Teilhard de Chardin suggest themselves. Both the paleontologist and the sociologist cherished their priesthood, yet remained outsiders to the ecclesiastical world. Both produced occasional writings of theological importance taking off from a secular commitment, though Teilhard's writing spans five decades and is perhaps ten or twenty times the volume of Camilo Torres'.

Teilhard makes no systematic study of Scripture or dogma but rather keeps returning to those elements that accord with his cosmic vision. Camilo is even more centered on a few texts and does not feel the need to perform a dredging operation on the Bible looking for "liberation" texts. The point is important for our present theological effort.

Camilo Torres reflects a theological vision elaborated out of participation in the struggle. His insights are not of dazzling brilliance. They are rather elemental, stark, overly simple, as was perhaps his tactical decision to go to the guerrillas. They are a model of where a liberating theology can be discovered, as a participant in the struggle. This is his permanent value.

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TERRY G. SPEAR

LYRIC

"Green, green, how much I want you green . . ."
Oh, but, Lorca, what can green steel,
what can green coal slag mountains,
what can green and unvirgin spinster
in her life-old prism?
Lordy, lordy, when the mind blows green
down from orange autumn hills
and the beauty quivers up in your bones,
sings up in your eyes, colors ripple
in your thighs,
what Judas-silver mirror tells the truth?
Strange colors come from the clear light of desire.

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THE SCREEN

Cabaret is ultimately pretty weak schnapps. It takes the Berlin of the 1930's—the Berlin of George Grosz cartoons and Christopher Isherwood stories (on which the film was based, as they would say in German)—and turns it into a backdrop for a musical. How watered down this concoction can be is most apparent in the film's only sub-plot. A department-store heiress, Natalya (Marisa Berenson), meets a gigolo, Fritz (Fritz Wepper). She is a Jew, which complicates things; but he is inept, which simplifies them again. He falls so hopelessly in love with her that he admits he too is a Jew. Now they can be married at once. And live happily ever after? Well, maybe not, for there is Nazism to consider. An audience today could get pimples from a story like Fritz' and Natalya's, so the sugar loaf has to be sourdoughed with Nazism the way it is in *Cabaret*—or leavened with a few pogroms the way it is in *Fiddler on the Roof*. The Czar and Hitler play approximately the same role in these musicals that leukemia plays in *Love Story*.

The film's heroine, Sally Bowles, is a lot like Fritz. She too is saved from herself by her own ineptness and endeared to us. She wants passionately to be a femme fatale, "a most strange and exceptional person," as she herself often puts it. But she is hopelessly miscast playing such a role in life. This being the case, director Bob Fosse has astutely miscast Liza Minelli in Sally's part. As a young American entertainer aspiring to European decadence, Miss Minnelli is a natural. She cannot help striking us just the way Sally is supposed to—as a girl incapable of any real and lasting corruption. It is this quality that keeps *Cabaret* from becoming grim despite the ravages of booze, nymphomania, and Nazism. Miss Minnelli's appeal is libidinal in the most elementary sense of that word, which really connotes psychic energy rather than sexiness. She is so wide-eyed that the whites often show all the way around the irises. In 70 mm, if a girl knows how to use it, such an attribute can imply an eternal and immutably wholesome spirit.

Sally sings nightly in a tacky Berlin cabaret. But since Miss Minnelli is as improbable a chanteuse as her mother was, she does not do very well with appropriate torch songs of the sort designed to work by innuendo and oblique gesture. She is much better with upbeat numbers that throw aside pretense and say undisguisedly what the libido wants. The best of these by far is a tune called "Money, Money, Money, Money," which she performs with the cabaret's master of ceremonies (Joel Grey), the only man in the film bright enough not to be eclipsed by her. This number not only shows off Miss Minnelli's talents to best advantage, but also Mr. Fosse's. A Broadway choreographer whose film apprenticeship was directing *Sweet Charity*, Fosse demonstrates in this film that he has now learned the tricks of the movie musical trade.

The choreography that looks best on a stage often looks chaotic in a movie. On a stage the dance gestures have to be extravagant and the acrobatics spectacular. But in a film such movement goes by in a blur, especially when the camera tries to get close enough to catch the expressions of the dancers as well. This is why the want of muscularity and strenuousness in Fred Astaire's dancing has been an asset to his movie career. As the camera can't shoot Miss Minelli until it sees the whites of her eyes anyway, her movement must be considerably more subtle and minute than a stage dancer's would. In "Money, Money, Money, Money," Miss Minnelli and Mr. Grey simply twitch, tick, sidle and nuzzle in time to fast-paced music. It is the camera that moves boldly and dramatically here—that exerts itself and has to be choreographed.

A Comparison

In adapting *Cabaret* from the stage, Fosse has done something comparable to what Ken Russell did with *The Boy Friend*. In *Cabaret*'s original version, all the characters sang, not just those who appear on the cabaret stage with Sally. The other boarders where Sally lives had numbers, as did Brian (Michael York), the English scholar with whom she has an affair. But Fosse's production cuts the music out of every scene except the ones at the cabaret. Instead of subtracting music this way, Russell's *The Boy Friend* added a new story to the play on which it was based. But the result was the same: a melodrama that serves as a context (or pretext) for musical comedy routines.

Neither film has a particularly original idea here. In many ways *Cabaret* copies *The Blue Angel* just as *The Boy Friend* copied Berkeley's *Forty-Second Street*. But it is curious that two different directors should feel, independently and simultaneously, that their adaptations must somehow delimit the music in a musical. The restructuring Fosse has done seems to appeal to him because it allows cross-cutting between the numbers done on the cabaret stage and developments in the society outside—as if the former were a commentary on the latter as well as a part of it. The fact is that *Cabaret*'s wistful treatment of Germany during the rise of Nazism is only a part of our own society. *Cabaret* is only worth thinking about as a document of our times, not as a commentary on someone else's. As an interpretation of history, *Cabaret* is trivial the way that all musicals are.

COLIN L. WESTERBECK, JR.

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an exchange of views

Jesus as Superstar

Warrensburg, Mo.

To the Editors: I am in happily thorough agreement with Michael Murray on his assessment of *J. C. Superstar* and *Godspell* in his article, "I Was A Teenage Jesus" [Feb. 11]. I had always thought that that phrase, originally thought up by some Hollywood or Pressdom wag to tag Nicholas Ray's *King of Kings* film, was misused there, but was a perfect description of the new brash hits, especially the monstrously vulgar *Superstar.* (Others here at Newman heard me use the phrase to describe *Superstar* long before the Feb. 11 *Commonweal.*) The Ray film is riddled with faults, but at least it does not commit the crowning folly of altering the character of Jesus to suit the self-image wishful thinking of a particular group (although Jeffrey Hunter *is,* in appearance, far too American a Jesus), which is a fault shared by *Godspell, Superstar,* and the mistitled *Gospel According to Saint Matthew* (Pasolini, 1965).

The trick in the Ray film was to subdue the character of Jesus beneath overmuch plot and action and technicolor, but, when allowed to, Jesus comes through fairly well as the one sent from God who takes none of the worldly positions represented by each of the other characters in the film (including, in a way, John the Baptist, here played effectively, but a bit too urbanely, by Robert Ryan) but, instead, calls men out of the world to give them a different message which destroys some of the other stands, and completes the others that are only fragmentary. He is even allowed an actual physical resurrection. (Of course, the film does reflect both the trend to modern "humanism" of the slightly sentimental sort that has run through most "Biblical" films, and also the moralistic part of Christianity that has dominated official Christendom all of last century and most of this one, inasmuch as the Sermon on the Mount is the central and best scene of the film.)

In contrast, the "Jesus" of *Godspell* is really George M. Cohan, the one in *Superstar* a mixture of Jerry Rubin and James Dean, and the one in Pasolini's film is quite obviously not the Jesus Christ of Matthew, but Nikolai Lenin in pious disguise. The only two dramatic productions I have seen which presented the actual Jesus Christ of

'I Was a Teenage Jesus'

the Gospels and the Testaments are DeMille's 1927 *King of Kings* and the much deeper *Greatest Story Ever Told* (George Stevens, 1965). I will not here discuss the unbelievably savage crucifixion dealt to *The Greatest Story* by critics, their perpetuators, the insensitive, and certain people at United Artists too free with the scissors after the film's first run, except to say that the film, and actor Max von Sydow (in appearance on the screen a perfectly believable first-century Jew of exceptional qualities), caught poetically nearly every nuance of the character of Jesus presented by all four Gospels and the epistle writers. I suspect that the film was treated so poorly in the religious press because it so transcended, illuminated, and challenged denominational dogmatisms and modern Sunday school and seminary and other cowardly versions of Christianity, that it embarrassed a great many churchmen and professional religionists. It is as if the film were "a stumbling block" to the professionally pious and the denominational and theological axgrinders, and "folly" to the complacently sophisticated, the "worldly-wise," and devoted businessmen. However, that's a tack I want to take up at a future date.

Actually, though I wanted to say all this, it is all actually a lead up to the one point wherein I disagree with Mr. Murray. He says, in general criticism of dramatic presentations of Christ, "How can a transcendental event be translated into human drama?" My answer is that it not only can be, but that it is probably the best way to present such an event, indeed, isn't human drama the way used by the prophets and by Christ, himself? Why else would the author of *Genesis* present us with the Adam and Eve story? Why else do we have the dramatic Exodus story with its plagues, pillars of cloud and fire, Red Sea crossing, smoking Mount Sinai? Why else would Isaiah inform us of the cherubim and the burning coal; Elijah be able to call down fire on Mount Carmel; Ezekiel present us with a heavenly chariot brought in by dazzling Kurubs or preach to dead men's bones if the transcendental cannot be translated into human drama?

The accounts of the temptation of Jesus are intensely dramatic and it is only by Christ's own word that anyone knows of the occurrence at all. However it really might have happened, he chose to tell it to his disciples in that form. The accounts of Christ's Baptism in the "synoptic" Gospels follow this pattern:

> No sooner had he (Jesus) come up out of the water than he saw the heavens torn apart and the spirit, like a dove, descending on him. And a voice came from heaven, "You are my son, the Beloved; my favor rests on you." (Mark 1:10-11, JB)

No one can deny that that is dramatic. The two films that have done this scene, Ray's *King of Kings,* and

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The Greatest Story, have subdued and strengthened it, eliminating the torn open heavens, the dove, and the voice, yet the scene is terribly dramatically effective and fraught with insight through use of close-ups of the faces of Jesus and John, which, in *The Greatest Story* establishes deep insight.

Saint Paul tells us that the only thing he will preach is Christ, and him crucified. He even speaks of "the language of the cross." I challenge anyone to tell me that the story of the crucifixion of Christ is not a very deeply moving and effective piece of human drama. The theological faddists of a certain group may be going too much overboard in calling the crucifixion an "acted parable," but that quality *is* present in the event. Paul tells us that when we look on the crucified Christ, we see the measure of God's love for us.

And what of the Resurrection? How could you possibly bore anyone with the story of the Resurrection with its auras of mystery, suspense and surprise? No, it is as Emil Brunner says in *The Divine-Human Encounter,*

> (The) relation between God and man has not developed as doctrine but rather is set forth as happening in the story. (This) relationship is not of such a kind that (abstract) doctrine can adequately express it . . . hence narration is the proper form to describe it.

And as G. Ernest Wright and Reginald Fuller say in *The Book of the Acts of God*:

> Christianity . . . is a historical religion. In one sense this means that it has a history like all other religions . . . yet in another sense . . . Christianity among the religions seems to be the only that takes history seriously, *for it assumes that the knowledge of God is associated with events that really happened in human life.*

Therefore, the major portion of the Old Testament is no philosophical tract, but the story of Moses and the Exodus, and more than half the New Testament concerns the Gospel-Acts story, with the rest of it being chiefly commentary on the Story and its meaning.

Perhaps, though, in saying "human" drama Mr. Murray means concentration on personalities and their motivations. Well, it takes little wit to see that the great Old Testament stories center on the characters of men: Abraham, Moses, David, Isaiah; and God, himself, is portrayed as a character with emotions and motivations and actions.

Thus, in the opening chapters of Genesis we have God walking in the cool of the evening in the garden—a thing perfectly incomprehensible to merely speculative and abstract notions of God, but perfectly understandable in the context of dramatic presentation of the Acts of God.

In the New Testament, the character of Jesus completely dominates the Gospels and yet he is surrounded by highly colorful dramatic human characters: John the Baptist, Peter, John, Matthew, Herod Antipas, Pontius Pilate, Mary Magdalene, Mary of Bethany, Judas, etc. And as for perfectly clear, simplistic explanations of motivations of characters: does any really good work of literary or dramatic art offer such pat explanations of its characters? And what does Murray then think of such plays as those by Harold Pinter?

Perhaps "plain spirit in the popular arts can last just about four and a half minutes," but the history and traditions of Judaeo-Christianity seem to show that God deliberately works in a realm freely co-mingling "pure" spirit (Grecian, not a Hebrew abstraction) and matter: thus, a fiery chariot picks up Elijah instead of his just disappearing, God talks to Moses through a burning bush instead of just talking to him, Jesus raises from death, appears in the cenacle and eats fish. The fifth proposition of Euclid is "plain spirit"—the story of Jesus Christ is not.

Naturally, though, there must be some "spirit" in dramatic works—a great deal of it, in fact, if we mean by "spirit" both intellect and the heart. These *must* be the ruling factors in any drama or else it descends into meaningless movement and noise. It is this that *Godspell* and *Superstar* lack: a heartfelt and mindthought backing behind them. It is also what our severely polarized and abstracted modern society lacks as well.

STEPHEN P. HARRELL

Reply

Certainly there are many events in the Bible that are dramatic—indeed, as Mr. Harrell points out, some so theatrical that even Hollywood has found them excessive. The prophets and evangelists, I agree, knew that the only way to express a supernatural mystery and the best way to teach a lesson was by story-telling. The dramatist, however, and this is the point, is not trying to do either of these things. He (even Pinter) has rather the job of showing the often bizarre, hard to understand, but never superhuman actions of *people.*

This is where the transcendence of Jesus becomes a problem. I contend that the *character* of Jesus in the kind of human terms which will serve the purposes of drama, is at best elusive. Mr. Harrell, on the other hand, says that the actor in *The Greatest Story Ever Told* "caught poetically nearly every nuance of the character of Jesus presented by all four Gospels and the epistle writers." What can this astonishing statement mean? Presumably that some clear-cut, definable human being called Jesus, a personality with human traits and drives as identifiable as those of Hamlet, Blanche DuBois or your Uncle Charlie was here well delineated, down to "nearly" the last nuance. I didn't see this film, but I still don't buy it.

What are these nuances of character that Mr. Harrell recognized? Human beings, almost by definition, have doubts, fears, hopes, hesitations and guilts (not to mention dandruff, myopia, bad breath and other inconveniences) which influence their actions and help to form what we call personality or character in fiction or in life. Now even if we knew exactly how Jesus walked and talked, or that he had a habit of scratching his beard or rubbing his ear, or that he suffered from poor eyesight or hay fever, a Christian would still have to confront the essential mystery: that Jesus was both human and not. In some way this is saying that Jesus did not and could not sin, and as soon as that is said, the character of Jesus, or at least Jesus as a human *character,*

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blurs out of focus, whether he is scratching his beard and sneezing or not.

Mr. Harrell says that Jesus "dominates the Gospels and yet he is surrounded by highly colorful dramatic human characters." Does he dominate because he is more colorful, dramatic and human than the others? Or isn't it because, even though he is enigmatic, intangible and strangely inhuman, he himself, his very existence, is the message? This message is why the stories were written and is our focus when we read them; there is "color" enough in that alone.

Many artists, of course, have been attracted to the mystery of this story, but they have usually dealt with it on a symbolic level, as a way to reveal us to ourselves rather than a way to reveal God to us. In these cases, historical accuracy or theological orthodoxy are usually beside the point. Mr. Harrell stresses God's use of art to convey a message; I am talking about art's use of God—as the subject of a story or as a symbol of, in recent examples, gushing Peace and Love (*Godspell*) or the victimization of rock stars (*Jesus Christ Superstar.*)

My main quarrel with these two shows, and with others in the past, is not that they fail to give us an accurate picture of Jesus, which I consider impossible and unimportant in the theater, but rather that they trade on our built-in religious or cultural responses for their effects, and do not come to grips with any *drama.* To name a character Jesus and to stage some sort of crucifixion does not excuse the dramatist from arranging a coherent pattern of human action on the stage—*or* the screen. Religious enthusiasm, real or pretended, which I described as "spirit," might hold a song together, but it is a cop-out in drama.

MICHAEL MURRAY

BOOKS

A golden book, maybe . . . but no golden ledger

Worldly Goods

JAMES GOLLIN

Random House, $8.95

MICHAEL E. SCHILTZ

The Roman Catholic church is neither very wealthy nor very well run.

These are the two major findings in this pioneer study of church finances by a young journalist who had to learn about Roman Catholicism while he learned about its ledgers.

And therein is the weakness, as well as the strength, of the book. No one —even a Vatican professional—can master the traditions, lore, customs, prescripts, vocabulary, and mind-sets of the myriad vertical and horizontal levels of the universal church—let alone an inquirer who begins his efforts as an alien. Mr. Gollin does an admirable job and may be forgiven the expressions of wonder at nearly every page. Those who have labored in The Movement for a lifetime—whether in this or another millennium—have frequently been startled by a newly-perceived shimmer from its crystalline structure.

On the other hand, Mr. Gollin has no axe to grind. He does not belong to any of the church's internal warring factions. He is not for or against the new liturgy, celibacy, schools, bishops, "the institution," or other issues likely to obscure a balanced appraisal. Not initially hostile to Rome, his final sentence aptly sums up what value judgments about it he may have formed in the course of his inquiry: "We also owe a debt to the church as the curator of so much of our cultural heritage, and as the exemplar of the remarkable idea—remarkable at least in our time and our land—that money isn't everything."

But money is the subject of his book. Gollin deals with two themes: how much money does the church have, and how wisely does she manage it? And he insists that the first theme is only peripheral.

Quite so. The amount is little enough. Gollin places the aggregate value assets of the American church at about 34 billion dollars, of which about 25 billions are in diocesan holdings. For a church of upwards of 40 million members, not a staggering sum. Even so, Gollin is quick to warn that most of this is in specialized and poorly marketable real estate and is virtually illiquid. There are very few buyers for gingerbread Gothic. The liquid assets of the American church he places at about 3.4 billions, less than 20 percent of which are in commercial investments of any type, and all of which is overcommitted to the operating functions of the church.

Managing that amount is another question. Mr. Gollin learns that the church is decentralized indeed. The assets are vested in thousands of parishes, hundreds of diocesan operating and trust funds, and hundreds of religious order operations ranging from large universities to inner-city missions—all using differing financial records and all administratively related only in the loosest and most baffling sense. If any single work can finally lay to rest the myth of the monolithic church, it is this one.

Thus, estimating the magnitude of wealth and evaluating the efficiency of its management becomes a step-by-step process of generalizing, in turn, parish, diocesan, and religious order fiscal structures. For anything less than a good lifetime of work such a process is bound to be more impressionistic

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than scientific, and Mr. Gollin makes no pretensions otherwise. But on the basis of case studies, extensive interviews and the imaginative interpretation of what fragmentary data was available, he pieces together a vignette in which parish and diocesan finances, from purchasing to insurance and investment, wallow in mismanagement. The nitty-gritty details are best left to the reader.

In some particulars the author's impressions appear inaccurate. He seems to take the annual parish census and its reliability as a fact. He hopelessly confuses doctrinal orthodoxy with disciplinary obedience in the DuBay case and badly mishandles the dimensions of Bishop Sheil's retirement. He occasionally confuses the monastic life with the more general style of the regular orders. He probably overstates the role of Archbishop Hughes as a catalyst to the "know-nothing" reaction, and he offers no evidence that Catholics are "outraged" by the trafficking of religious orders in such trinkets as fruitcake and lace (I rather suspect the affect ranges from admiration to pity).

These criticisms are not made at the heart of Mr. Gollin's book, but on the margins. The anecdotal interviews, general impressions, and reworking of data that support his major managerial criticisms hang together quite well, and are quite consistent with what this reviewer, at least, has seen of the financial workings of American Roman Catholicism over the last decade.

Yet the book leaves a larger issue untouched. It is clearer to the practical Roman critic than it would be to Mr. Gollin that fiscal mismanagement is but a symptom of a deeper managerial malaise penetrating the whole church. Gollin, for example, attributes much of the pastor's fiscal inexpertise to what he believes to be the church's long-held conviction that its ministers should be trained in "a broad general education," as exemplified by classical languages and philosophy, rather than in the narrow arts of management. He has not learned us well enough to know that virtually no American cleric over 40 years of age was trained in either classical languages or philosophy and that in fact they received an exceedingly narrow vocational training in the mimicry of the Roman Ritual and the Baltimore catechism. Our hope for the future, for both fiscal and general pastoral management, is indeed a broader, more humanistic education of the clergy.

Gollin also falls short of making a similar connection with other phenomena that seem not to puzzle him as much as fascinate him. The first is the intense institutional pressure against delegation of authority at any level. This he seems to accept as one of the little peculiarities of Romanism, like beeswax candles and linen albs. If, as Gollin points out, the inability to delegate creates fiscal inefficiency, it also creates broad-spectrum managerial inefficiency; and it flows from the same defensive mind-set that keeps curates in peonage, news reporters at bay, and truth in a glass case.

Similarly, Gollin recites the paradox of the central fund without probing for its deeper meaning. If the bishop establishes a fund to aid inner-city parishes on a voluntary basis, wealthy suburban pastors won't come in. If he makes it mandatory, the suburban pastors will begin hiding their funds. This is a curious dilemma for a Christian institution, and left at that level it seems to suggest that suburban pastors are notoriously avaricious. Yet the suburban pastor cannot long give downtown what he cannot raise at home. And his parishioners have been long trained to support their parish for quite selfish reasons: the embellishment of their own temple and the religious education of their own children. This thrust has complex historical roots, and may be in large measure unique to the American church; but it is in any case deeply enmeshed in its administrative institutions. For the same reason, of course, closing down the parish schools will not free any measurable amount of funds for other charitable purposes unless there is a substantial revolution in parish mores generally.

The limitation of *Wordly Goods*, then, is a limitation of context (except

Summer Sessions

MADONNA HOUSE, Combermere, Ont., Canada. Summer volunteer program, May 15-Sept. 15.

COMMUNICATION CENTER, 1001 Union, St. Louis, Mo. 63113. Three-week institutes in effective group leadership, starting June 5, July 3 and Aug. 7.

LORAS COLLEGE, Dubuque, Iowa 52001. Priests' institute, June 6-8.

TRINITY COLLEGE, Burlington, Vt. 05401. Biblical Institute, June 18-23.

CATHOLIC SEMINARY FOUNDATION, Marian College, Indianapolis, Ind. 46208. Workshop on teaching values, June 18-24.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO, San Diego, Calif. 92110. Seminar in Hinduism, June 19-29.

NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY, Notre Dame, Ind. 46556. African institute, June 19-July 14.

COLLEGE OF ST. TERESA, Winona, Minn. 55987. Post-graduate, undergraduate & pre-college summer programs, June 19-July 28.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY, St. Louis, Mo. 63103. School of Divinity summer institute, June 20-July 28.

ST. FRANCIS SEMINARY, Loretto, Pa. 15940. Theological workshop, June 26-29.

DE PAUL UNIVERSITY, Chicago, Ill. 60604. School of Music summer session, June 26-July 28.

VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, Villanova, Pa. 19085. Theology institute, June 19-24, M.A. program in theology, June 29-Aug. 4.

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY, Bronx, N.Y. 10458. John XXIII Institute for Eastern Christian Studies, July 5-Aug. 11.

COLLEGE OF MT. ST. JOSEPH, Mt. St. Joseph (Cincinnati) Ohio 45056. Institute on Futurology, July 25-28.

COLLEGE MISERICORDIA, Dallas, Pa. 18612. Institute on sacred scripture, Aug. 13-18.

ASPEN THEATRE INSTITUTE, Aspen, Colo. 81611. Religious drama workshop, Aug. 14-27.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, Hanover, N.H. 03755. Master of Arts in liberal studies summer program.

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY, Chicago, Ill. 60626. M. A. in theology program.

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for the concluding few chapters on Vatican finance, which are anecdotal, repetitious, and unreliable).

Perhaps what is needed is another study, to pick up where Gollin left off, and integrate his findings into a larger thesis that the church is mismanaged most where it matters the most—in terms of its real, non-worldly mission. It might then fairly be concluded that the modern administrative church that fosters excessive decentralization, petty jealousy, administrative secrecy, inability to delegate, and selfish personal values, is the same modern administrative church that was curator of the wrong cultural values in 19th-century Europe and 20th-century Latin America; that what we are dealing with is what Charles Reich might call "Consciousness Zero"—an all-pervasive inability to manage goals that spills over into every aspect of activity.

The administrative church is not the quaint thing that James Gollin thinks it is. Fortunately, it is not the whole church, either.

The New Novel from Queneau to Pinget

VIVIAN MERCIER

Farrar, Straus, $10

WALLACE FOWLIE

No literary form reflects more accurately than does the novel the ever-changing structure of society and the ever-changing moral and metaphysical problems of society. During the period between the two wars, French novelists were less interested in telling a story than in raising questions in the minds of their readers: moral problems in the novels of François Mauriac and Montherlant, metaphysical problems concerning the meaning of life, as in Malraux, theological problems concerning man's salvation as in Bernanos and Julien Green.

With World War II and the advent of the existentialist writers, there was a fairly distinct break with those two types of novels: the novel where the story element is strong, and the novel with a moral-metaphysical preoccupation. *La Nausée* of Sartre and *L'Etranger* of Camus are not narratives in the usual sense. They ask the reader to examine the reason for man's existence and for his actions. The existentialist novel shows man facing the strangeness of his life and of his habits, experiencing disgust with himself and with his existence, becoming aware of a fundamental absurdity in his behavior.

Then came, in the fifties, the so-called "new Novel," which is the subject of Vivian Mercier's book, in which he studies the art of seven novelists by focusing on one novel of each writer. All of these novels, with the exception of one (Queneau's *Le Chiendent*) were published within five years (1957-1962). By the time the Fifth Republic was created, the French novelist had become, especially with the example of Alain Robbe-Grillet (whose book *La Jalousie* is examined closely by Mr. Mercier), a technocrat of the novel, whose art seems to be a minute inventory of objects, a form that had cut itself off from the routine of the psychological novel.

Quite justifiably, Professor Mercier asks the question: what do the new novelists write about? When asked this question, they themselves have almost all answered—"about nothing!" Their subject matter is deliberately reduced to a minimum. *Le Planétarium*, Nathalie Sarraute's novel chosen by Mr. Mercier for special analysis, is about the purchase of some chairs and an exchange of apartments. Butor's *La Modification*, also analyzed by Mr. Mercier, centers on the problem of whether a man in a train between Paris and Rome should break off or not break off the liaison with his Roman mistress.

In addition to Professor Mercier's book, there is only one other book in English on the new novel: John Sturrock's *The French New Novel*, in which the critic limits himself to the study of three writers: Claude Simon, Michel Butor and Alain Robbe-Grillet. To these three, Mr. Mercier adds detailed treatments of Mme. Sarraute, Claude Mauriac, Robert Pinget, and one earlier novelist, Raymond Queneau whose *Le Chiendent* was first published in 1933. The chapter on Queneau is one of the most illuminating in the book. Whereas Sturrock's volume seems to be addressed to readers already familiar with the new novelists, Mercier's would serve as an excellent guide to the reader coming to the novelists for the first time.

Mr. Mercier has an extensive knowledge of Joyce and perhaps overemphasizes in his introduction the influence of Joyce on the French writers. One wonders why he does not give a full chapter to Samuel Beckett, who in the minds of many, is the leading "new" novelist, and why he attaches so much importance to Claude Mauriac. But these are minor questions concerning a book which was needed and which will serve as an intelligent history and guide.

Vivian Mercier shows how the theory of commitment, so significant in existentialist writing of the forties, is replaced by the problem of perception in the new novels of the fifties and sixties. The differences between these writers are evident in the various ways they approach the problem of perception, in the degrees they manifest of awareness of the exterior world, and the degrees of their grasp of the mind's inner reality.

In his description of the art of Claude Simon, Mr. Mercier carefully points out influences of Proust and Faulkner. The pages he devotes to *La Route des Flandres* (translated by Richard Howard as *The Flanders Road*) surpass anything this reviewer has seen written by the French critics of Simon. No one action is uppermost in this novel, and we follow a series of scenes, of pictures, of states of being. The death of a horse would seem to be an episode of some importance. It bears relationship with other developments: with men who are prisoners in Germany, with a jockey's memory of a race, with the owner of a stable.

The new novelists, and those who are still newer than the writers studied by Mr. Mercier: Jean-Pierre Faye and Jean-Marie Le Clézio, for example,

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believe the world has to be reinvented or rediscovered. Butor, Sarraute and Simon have set new décors and rediscovered objects, wind and grass. The new novel is not merely a stylistic exercise, a transformation of the fictional genre. It is a discovery of an original freshness in the world. The new form of fiction that has been developing in France, which is perhaps not as new as some spokesmen have claimed, reflects everything: the inventions of the day, the political impasses of the day, the current views on man's fate, the fashions of dress and manners and philosophies, the research carried out in psychology, sociology, anthropology, ethnology. The new novel derives from everything: ideas, manners, politics, sciences, and it gives back this varied nourishment in forms that are narration and commentary and interpretation.

The Occult

COLIN WILSON

Random House, $10.00

The Occult Revolution

RICHARD WOODS

Herder and Herder, $6.50

JACOB NEEDLEMAN

What to do about the occult? Interest in magic, witchcraft, spiritualism and so forth continues to grow and is no longer confined to the disaffected young or to the lonely. And the line no longer seems quite so sharp that separates occultism from religion on the one side, and from science on the other. Time was when one could safely say that religion taught men how to live humanly in a divinely ordered universe while science taught men how to submit their perceptions of reality to the test of impartial reason. The occult existed far off to the side, luring men to religious feeling where scientific thinking was appropriate, and *vice versa*. But now the disasters of technology and the vacillations of religion have brought many to see that we modern men are stranded between a fragmented picture of the universe and an unconvinced sense of the meaning of human life. Is occultism the force that can heal the peculiarly Western rupture between the study of nature and the search for what it means to be human? Or is the growing interest in the occult only the latest product of the misguided separation of religion and science?

Coming at the occult from opposite directions, here are two books which rather clearly expose the difficulties of being intelligent about this question. Colin Wilson's *The Occult*, like many of his previous books, spans a staggeringly wide spectrum of ideas and thinkers. Wilson's claim is that magic is "the science of the future" and he views the entire history of human thought as the progressive development in man of a latent power which he calls "Faculty X," "the power that human beings possess *to reach beyond the present*." Faculty X, he says, "is the key not only to so-called occult experience, but to the whole future of the human race."

It is an extremely diffuse concept which allows him no basis for clear discrimination between, say, the psychic excesses of hysterical Victorians and the transfigured vision of men such as Sri Ramakrishna or G. I. Gurdjieff. Wilson takes us from primitive man through the ancient wisdom schools of Egypt and Greece, through the history of Christianity and Kabbalistic Judaism up to the Theosophists, spiritualists and psychics of modern times, with intensive reportage along the way on vampires, wolfmen, flying saucers, recent neurophysiological research and the great poets and mystics of all traditions. Not to mention Jesus, Muhammed, Lao-Tse and Gautama Buddha. Everything is more or less Faculty X.

To some small extent, the book is redeemed by the fascinating anecdotes and facts which Wilson's voracious reading has turned up, and which his slack conceptual structure permits him to throw in on almost every page. But what is most instructive is the overwhelming failure of the book to distinguish what is serious from what is irrelevant in this whole area. It is not Wilson's failure alone; we are all more or less at a loss in the face of what we do not understand. We all seem to find ourselves faced with the choice of promoting the Unknown, as Wilson does, or of 'taming' it with familiar categories as the very reasonable and fair-minded Richard Woods does in his *The Occult Revolution*.

Compared to Wilson's book, *The Occult Revolution* is modest and carefully focused. Father Woods is concerned to understand how the failure of the churches has provoked young Americans into turning to the occult, and how this failure represents modern man's shrunken grasp of the range of the life of faith. Leading up to his analysis, he devotes more than half the book to a balanced and untendentious history of occultism and the background of Western religion's condemnation of it. The impression is of a churchman absolutely unafraid to look directly at a phenomenon which many feel threatens the life of the Church.

> . . . the occult revolution is a spiritual awakening, threatened, to be

Ross Terrill.

China expert for CBS-TV coverage of President Nixon's trip to China. Winner of the coveted George Polk Memorial Award for outstanding achievement in journalism. Author of "by far the finest account so far of life in the land of Mao,"[1] a book that is "fascinating,"[2] "one of the best and most illuminating pieces about contemporary China that I have yet read."[3]

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sure, by the temptation to settle for cheap magical tricks, but also pregnant with possibilities for opening new vistas of mental and spiritual progress—a deeper understanding of human potential and perhaps of new development in our awareness of the less obvious mechanics of the mysterious universe which is our home.

He makes his case partly by showing how the church's own superstitious fear led in the past to exaggerated reactions against forms of spiritual search which it ought to have embraced, and partly by arguing that the main motivation of young occultists is the need to experience more of life than either the church or modern technocratic society allows for.

But he is at his best in his perception of the dangers of occultism. Without wishing, he says, to deny outright the objective existence of forces and beings (such as the devil) which the occultists speak of, he interprets the categories of magic, witchcraft and gnosticism existentially in a manner reminiscent of Bultmann's demythologization of the Bible. Defining the demonic as "any natural function which has power to take over the whole person," he sees occultism as an attempt to escape the crushing depersonalization of modern institutions and technology, which he identifies with the 'principalities and powers' spoken of by St. Paul and the gnostics. It is here that he sees the danger, even while recognizing the value of occultism as the enemy of technocracy. As a mere reaction, and cut off from the balancing influences of authentic tradition, occultism easily becomes another ideology, another hypnotic image of man which can deprive its advocates of the freedom they seek outside technocracy. In the moving final pages of his book, Father Woods concludes that:

> Insofar as . . . occultist beliefs answer a need for security and order amid a chaotic world, the freeing message of the Gospel will fall on deaf ears. We must learn that our only security comes from our loving trust in the Father, who alone can save. . . . Real faith means enduring not only chaos, absurdity and uncertainty in this world, . . . but doing so willingly, affirming our reliance on God alone, celebrating our debility and weakness as the opportunity for God to work through and in us.

In the final analysis, however, Father Woods has not discriminated between modern, youthful occultism and the real search for oneself in an astonishing and unknown cosmic scheme. He has explained the psychodynamic meaning of contemporary occultism, but at the price of making everything between ordinary man and absolute God seem understandable in familiar categories. His step from fallen man to God is so brisk that the divinity Himself seems taken out of the realm of the unknown. The ancient disciplines of alchemy and astrology at the very least communicated the great scale of creation between man and God, a scale which modern science and philosophy have obliterated. Consequently, even such intelligent men as Father Woods feel compelled to make the religious life all too "known," while such writers as Colin Wilson make of the unknown something which merely plays upon man's predilection for the sort of power which, coming from science, is now threatening our life on earth. Between an all-too-familiar religiosity and an all-too-optimistic hyperscientism there lies the real unknown for our time: the call of a deeper inwardness that reflects an awesomely conscious and many-levelled universe.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 155)

present moment.

The statement by Algeria that three U.S. Dominicans backed the coup of Banzer could not be further from the truth. The Santa Cruz university center, directed by those priests, has been raided nine times and strafed by machine-gun fire twice since the August revolution. Because of their opposition to Marxist socialism and violence, the Dominicans have been a target of ISAL for the past three years. At the same time the stand of the Dominicans for radical and rapid change in Bolivia, as evidenced in their published "Theological Reflections," especially "Total Liberation" has earned them the strong rejection of powerful rightist groups. In Rojas' book *Third World Priests*, published in December of 1971, one of the Dominicans is accused of being the leader of the ELN, (The Army of National Liberation) a Communist group similar to the Tupamaros of Uruguay; an accusation as ridiculous as that of Algeria.

(REV.) JAMES BURKE, O.P.

Tunnel Safety

Chicago, Ill.

To the Editors: In a recent issue of *Commonweal* ["Those Famous Washington Tunnels," Mar. 10] several references were made to the "Zero In" program of the National Safety Council. The article implies that the Council's philosophy for preventing occupational injuries and illnesses soft-pedals management's responsibilities for providing a safe workplace and further implies that the Council's philosophy is limited to educating employees to be careful.

The National Safety Council never has, is not now, and never will "soft-pedal" the responsibility of management to provide a safe and healthful work environment for employees. Since its very beginning, the Council has recognized that the responsibility for implementing an effective occupational safety and health program rests squarely on management's shoulders.

To be specific, the Council included in its ACCIDENT PREVENTION MANUAL FOR INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS (from the second through the current sixth edition), the following elements of safety programming:

I. MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP (Assumption of responsibility—declaration of policy)

II. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY (To operating officials—safety directors —supervisors—committees)

III. MAINTENANCE OF SAFE WORKING CONDITIONS (Inspections—engi-

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neering revisions—purchasing—supervisors)

IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFETY TRAINING (For supervisors—for workers)

V. AN ACCIDENT RECORD SYSTEM (Accident analysis—reports on injuries—measurement of results)

VI. MEDICAL AND FIRST AID SYSTEMS (Placement examinations—treatment of injuries—first aid services—periodic health examinations)

VII. ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY EMPLOYEES (Training—maintenance of interest)

The Council's "Zero In" program is in large measure aimed at basic element No. VII. The objective of the "Zero In" program is to relate to the employee in an effort to gain his acceptance of his personal responsibility for working safely. This in no way implies that the first six elements are not equally, or more, important. Unfortunately, your article fails to refer to the other six basic elements espoused by the Council for more than twenty years.

Since the formation of the National Safety Council in 1913, work deaths for 100,000 population have been reduced 67 percent. In 1912, an estimated 18,000 to 21,000 workers' lives were lost while producing $100 billion worth of Gross National Product. In 1970, with a work force doubled in size and producing nine times as much GNP, work deaths were reduced to 14,200. The record shows that National Safety Council members have injury frequency rates that average 70 percent lower than the national rate and severity rates more than 40 percent lower. The record speaks for itself. Still, we all have a long way to go.

We trust that the above information will be utilized to set the record straight with respect to the issues at hand.

JOHN D. LAWLOR
Executive Vice President
National Safety Council

REPLY: To "set the record straight" with regard to the role of the National Safety Council in the job health and safety movement would require much more space than that normally allotted to author rebuttals. The Council's performance over the years in promoting a "please-let's-all-be-careful" approach has served its corporate financial supporters well by obscuring the need for designing work hazards out of the industrial environment. The injury-recording technique used by the Council has massively underreported the frequency of job accidents, and has until recently succeeded in covering up the awful dimensions of industry's human toll. At the same time, the Council has blithely ignored occupational diseases, despite the burgeoning onslaught of fumes, dusts, chemicals and stresses that accompany modern technology. The results achieved by the voluntarism espoused by the Council, in tandem with weak regulation by the states, convinced Congress to pass the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. which gives the federal government broad authority to safeguard America's factories and workshops.

The record indeed speaks for itself.

JOSEPH A. PAGE
MARY-WIN O'BRIEN
Co-authors, Nader Report on
Occupational Safety and Health

Black Con III

Philadelphia, Pa.

To the Editors: There is a traditional opinion in the teaching of Roman Catholic Christianity (cfr. *Moral and Pastoral Theology*, by Henry Davis, S.J., vol II, p 310), that in cases of extreme need one may appropriate the goods of another without being guilty of moral fault. Such an action is not called stealing but *taking*. In such need the goods of the earth become common property and rights of exclusive private ownership lapse.

It is not easy to say if the instances cited in "Black Con III" by Douglas McFerran [Mar. 10] are cases of extreme need. But if they are, then the taking of the goods of another is justified. This would not be an "ethic of the streets," nor would it be a "law of the jungle," nor would it be peculiar to a "black value system," nor would it be "a new value system." It could be called traditional Christian teaching.

WILLIAM G. AYLWARD

Commonweal welcomes letters on subjects treated in its pages. Letters of not more than 250 or 300 words naturally have a better chance of being published.

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Biblical Institute

● BIBLICAL INSTITUTE, Trinity College, Burlington, Vermont 05401. JUNE 18-23. Anderson, Bennett, Cathcart, Collins, Duncker, Murphy-O'Connor. Write: Director.

Creative Teaching

● CREATIVE ENVIRONMENT: A WORKSHOP on teaching values in present structures. Designed for all persons interested in creative programs of education in values. Resource persons: Gerard Pottebaum, Rick Woods, Merrill Harmon, Brian Hall and others. June 18-24, 1972. Fee $100. Board and Room $40. Academic credit. At Marian College, co-sponsored by Catholic Seminary Foundation. Write to: CREATIVE ENVIRONMENT, Catholic Seminary Foundation, 4545 Northwestern Ave., Indianapolis, Ind. 46208.

African Institute

● SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. Summer Institute, 19 June-14 July, 1972. Designed for Christians, religious and lay, who anticipate working in Africa. Details from Dr. Peter Walshe, African Studies, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556.

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To the Occasional Reader:

THIS APRIL 21 ISSUE seems to us typical of *Commonweal's* timeliness and topicality. It also comes directly after issues of the magazine which presented a definitive study of the busing situation, eight diverse views on the China trip and the status of the death penalty with the courts. Now in our pages, with the charges against ITT raising the specter of United States imperialism, Richard B. Du Boff and Edward S. Herman examine the actual extent and ramifications of American big business abroad.

In this same issue Ralph Whitehead, Jr. reports from Chicago on a notable grassroots meeting on rents and housing in our American cities; Phillip Berryman writes from Panama City on the theological significance of Camilo Torres and there is a stimulating exchange of views on Jesus and the theater.

Informative as this one week's sample is, you will be able to discover the full force and unique flavor of this lay-directed journal of opinion only by reading successive issues of *Commonweal* for several months. To make this possible for you at a minimum of inconvenience, we are offering a trial subscription of 17 issues for only $3—over 400 pages of meaningful political, cultural and religious comment at a saving of 55% of the magazine's single-copy price. Simply fill in and return the handy trial coupon.

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